Abstract This article discusses recent developments in and new principles of European social health insurance (SHI). It analyses how privatization policies and competition have altered social insurance and whether financial difficulties are caused by social insurance features not evident in other types of health care systems. There is little if any evidence that SHI causes higher cost increases than other types of systems. The comparison of five European SHI systems demonstrates that despite cost containment policies these countries do not experience a trust crisis in health care or loss in support among the public. The author shows that SHI has moved toward universal health care and that the traditional values of solidarity and social security have even been strengthened over the past decades.
practice, social insurance may be provided directly by the government acting as insurer, as with Medicare. SHI in Europe, however, has in the past included arrangements, as in Germany and the Netherlands, in which a majority of the population had compulsory coverage by nonprofit insurers, while a substantial minority, defined by income and occupation, had private insurance. Some scholars defined government coverage as a different type (Glaser 1991) .
This article focuses on Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The first four systems developed from Bismarckian workers' health insurance, originally structured by the state but focused on only a portion of society. A long process of dual inclusion expanded both the population and benefits covered, making the original workers' health insurance more universal (Alber 1982) . When Alber wrote in the 1980s, Switzerland was a clear outlier. It relied far more on private insurance, without compulsory coverage or contributions defined as a percentage of income. It remains more similar to US arrangements than to those of the other countries reviewed here. But, as described in this article, it has in important ways moved closer to the traditional European version of social insurance.
Developments in the 1990s and since, with an emphasis on both the alleged economic burdens of coverage and efficiencies of markets (Maarse 2006) , raised questions about whether SHI was outmoded or solidarity threatened (Maarse and Paulus 2003) . This review therefore focuses on the following topics. First, to what extent have privatization policies and greater competition altered social insurance, and with private insurance facing stronger regulation in many countries, has social and private health insurance overall become more similar? Second, all developed health care systems face rising health care outlays and struggle to finance their ever higher health care costs. I asked whether some of these difficulties are caused by social insurance features not evident in other types of health care systems. I conclude by discussing whether the pressures on and responses within these SHI programs have created a crisis of trust or loss in support among the public. 1 1. Inevitably, some other important questions cannot be addressed. I do not address questions of delivery and payment reform that are not specific to social insurance arrangements, such as implementation of some form of diagnosis related groups payment for hospitals or promotion of primary care. Nor do I address the full range of changes in governance arrangements within SHI systems, such as the frequent adjustment of the roles of the state and insurance funds within France (e.g., Franc and Polton 2006). Contrary to some expectations, SHI in Europe has further expanded toward universal coverage, with access to health care considered a right based on either direct or indirect financial contributions. Indeed, Germany is now the only example in Europe where groups of the population can opt out from the main insurance system. And, since 2009, the overall population is required to be covered by either social or private insurance. In Switzerland the major reform of 1996 introduced mandatory health insurance for all permanent residents.
The traditional Dutch arrangements were, as in Germany, a parallel system of social and private health insurance. Although some commentators have emphasized privatization processes and market-oriented reform rhetoric, the main change from a long process culminating in 2006 was the abolition of the former two-tier system and the implementation of compulsory health insurance for the overall population. In France the social insurance had been supplemented, for most people, with gap coverage through either nonprofit mutuelles or private insurers. Low-income people were least likely to have this coverage. As costs and the burden of cost sharing increased, this became a larger concern, and in 2000 France created a system of publicly funded gap coverage for the poor. That reform also created a right to a basic package of health care irrespective of employment status (Hassenteufel and Palier 2007) .
In Switzerland and the Netherlands, solidarity is not based on the traditional method of redistribution by income-related premiums. In those nations premiums are now flat rates, with further subsidies for redistribution and affordability collected through the tax system. This special assistance for some could compromise the traditional perception of access to health care as a right. These two countries have also softened the traditionally strict separation between SHI and the commercial coverage that was permitted for services not covered by SHI. Coverage was provided by different types of organizations: social insurance by corporate bodies and private insurance by commercial firms. In both countries, insurers now are allowed to offer both social and commercial insurance. Nonetheless, the relationship between social and commercial health insurance remains highly regulated. In Switzerland, for example, private or voluntary health insurance can be offered by private for-profit companies or by mandatory nonprofit SHI organizations that have a voluntary for-profit branch. Swiss patients have to pay 10% of the price of all SHI services directly out of pocket, and complementary private health insurance for these user charges is prohibited (De Pietro et al. 2015) . This illustrates that, even where the separation of social and commercial health insurance is less firm, public regulation ensures that social insurance principles of common benefit remain central.
In the past, there could be many different funds, but people tended to be in funds according to occupation or geography. Over recent decades, choice among funds has been encouraged in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland; this has been followed by extensive consolidation of funds.
In Germany, choice and thus competition among funds was expanded in 1993. One of the main justifications for competition among SHI funds was that assignment based by occupation created large financial inequalities in income-related premiums, with sicker and lower-income groups paying more. The ability to switch led to the number of funds declining to 110 in 2018, only a 10th of the prereform number, as many funds merged. Premiums were also made more similar through introduction of a risk-structure compensation fund, which produced a major financial redistribution among funds. In 2009 the government began setting SHI contribution rates, and since 2015, individual funds can demand an additional contribution of only 1% of gross wages. German sickness funds also have little authority to vary their terms of coverage. The risk adjustment's equalization fund aims to shift competition toward quality of service and not on selection of "good risks." Competition and choice in Germany have been associated with greater standardization and redistribution, even as changing funds has become even easier in SHI than in private health coverage. (In private schemes a change of fund generates higher premiums.)
At the same time, private health insurance has faced stronger state regulation. In cases where private health insurance members are not able to pay rising premiums, they can opt for a "basic tariff" unrelated to risk at the standard premiums. Such a choice would offer benefits similar to SHI (Busse and Blümel 2014; Rothgang et al. 2010) . State regulation in SHI (e.g., fixed contribution rates) and in private insurance (e.g., "basic tariff") has been strengthened, with the result that private and SHI have become more similar.
Health reform in Switzerland is institutionally difficult because of the broad consensus required among major stakeholders for major change (Immergut 1992) . The major Swiss reform of 1996-when mandatory health insurance was introduced for all permanent residents -was the product of sustained debate and serious struggle. What emerged-uniform premiums within each region (a canton or part of a canton; the 26 cantons are the member states of the Swiss Confederation) independent of health status, gender, and income-was a move toward more of an SHI approach. Yet it promoted "market" logic through semiannual citizen choice among different insurance and deductible models. The Swiss increasingly have chosen managed care plans (mainly insurance plans with some restriction of provider choice), which expanded from less than 10% market share in 2003 to more than 60% in 2013. For those in managed care plans, however, switching insurance plans is more restricted.
As in other countries, the Swiss have had to strengthen risk adjustment systems to reduce incentives for selection. The first risk-adjustment formula worked with gender and age only. Reform in 2012, with a new formula taking former hospitalization into account, resulted in a 66% increase in the funds redistributed from 2011 to 2012 (De Pietro et al. 2015) . Controversy continues about solidarity issues, such as the limited risk pooling arising from limiting sickness fund choice to the region of residence, and the different levels of insurance premiums in different regions, with resulting interregional inequality.
The Dutch reform of 2006-seemingly the most decisive in a two-decade process-created a system between German and Swiss approaches. Abolition of the previous split between SHI and private insurance has been accompanied by an expanded role for flat-rate premiums and greater cost sharing. The mandatory deductible increased from about US$180 in 2008 to US$460 in 2016. Some advocates believed competition would increase value for money, but there is little reason to believe that has occurred. Government responded to continued cost increases relative to GDP by imposing strict caps on spending growth (Kroneman et al. 2016) .
While reforms of mainstream medical care over the long run have increased solidarity (through reform and then elimination of the separate private insurance) more than decreased it (through the cost sharing and flat-rate premiums), developments in long-term care might be judged differently. The Dutch system since the 1960s had included a separate insurance system for "exceptional medical expenses," predominantly long-term care. Legislation to cut public expenditure, in 2007 and more radically in 2015, shifted costs both to the municipalities and to patients or their families. This also involved shifting some benefits to the main SHI system, but national sharing of costs overall seems to have declined (Jongen 2017; Kroneman et al. 2016; Maarse and Jeurissen 2016) .
Reforms in France, beyond creation of the couverture maladie universelle (CMU), have mainly addressed cost and financing issues rather than insurance design (Casassus 2017) , so it is addressed below. Compared to the other countries, Austria may be thought of as boring. Sometimes, however, boring means being successful. Universal health care was basically introduced in the 1950s, and most Austrians are covered by regional SHI funds with income-related premiums. The Austrian authorities have not implemented versions of competition as in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. It therefore has not required the further state intervention associated with governing competition in Germany and the Netherlands (Rothgang et al. 2010 ).
Costs and Financing of Social Health Insurance Systems
As with other types of health care financing in other rich democracies, European SHI systems have experienced rising costs (Wendt 2015) . In 2016, the share of financing was 10.4% of GDP in Austria, 11.0% in France, 11.3% in Germany, 10.5% in the Netherlands, and 12.4% in Switzerland. All of these countries, however, remained far from the United States figure of 17.2% of the GDP spent on medical care. Furthermore, other types of health care systems, such as the Danish and Swedish, were also at spending levels between 10% and 11%.
The employment basis of traditional SHI, however, makes financing pressures especially visible, through the continuous and sometimes steep rise of individuals' mandatory insurance contributions. While these developments cannot keep up with the faster increase of insurance premiums in US employer-sponsored insurance, they have been an increasing burden for insured persons and employers in Europe. In Germany, for example, social insurance contributions (calculated as a percentage of wage income, with employers and employees each paying 50%) increased from about 8% in 1970 to 12% in the early 1980s to 14.6% of gross wage income (up to a ceiling) today.
SHI contributions based on employment grow even more dynamically than total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, because the wage ratio, the share of national income accounted for by wages, has declined. In Germany, it fell from about 75% in the early 1980s to 68% in 2015. In addition, in traditional SHI as in Germany the premiums have been charged only up to an upper income ceiling, now US$5,300 per month. Those with an income above this ceiling, therefore, pay a lower net percentage, and increases in wage inequality can make the taxed portion of wages even less adequate. Different countries have responded to this financing problem in different ways.
In France, the main change took place in 1998, when the financial base of all social insurance was broadened by phasing in replacement of employees' (but not employers') payroll contributions with a "general social contribution" imposed on all personal income. 2 This includes higher rates for capital income and gambling winnings, and lower rates for government benefit income, than for wage earnings (Chevreul et al. 2015) . These rates were further changed in 2017 legislation: in 2018, 9.2% on employees' gross salary but with a 13% contribution by employers (CLEISS n.d.).
In contrast, Switzerland never had insurance paid from payroll taxes and instead relies on community-rated premiums that vary by region and age groups (though with one rate above age 26). Individuals can also shape their payments by choosing insurance plans, for example, whether to have family doctors as gatekeepers or to have higher deductibles. The share of health expenditure paid for by SHI is unusually low in Switzerland, about 36% in 2012; this is partly because of high cost sharing (so 20.5% was paid out of pocket), partly because other insurance (e.g., accident and disability) paid over 10%, and partly because governments directly subsidize some costs, especially for hospitals (20.3% in 2012) (De Pietro et al. 2015) . The community-rated premiums are considered unaffordable for about 30% of enrollees, who receive subsidies determined by the cantons but with a bit more than half the funding passed through from the federal government. Cantons also pay insurers for a large part of the premiums for about 100,000 people who skip payments (De Pietro et al. 2015) . All forms of finance mean that the problem of financing from labor income is far less relevant in Switzerland than in the other countries. Redistribution among income groups, however, is lower than in Austria, Germany, and France.
The Netherlands has elements of both contributions as a percentage of income and the Swiss fixed-premium model. In 2015, income-related contributions for employees were at 6.95%, with a ceiling of US$4,415 per year. Additionally, community-rated premiums independent of health, gender, and age are set by the insurance funds. These premiums varied between US$100 and US$133 per month in 2015 (Kroneman et al. 2016) . Dutch insurance encourages more cost sharing than in Germany, though less than in Switzerland, and taxes (about 13% of total health expenditure) are used specially to pay for income-related subsidies for the flat-rate premiums. Dutch financing therefore has reduced pressures on payroll contributions, though concerns about both the income-related contributions and flat premiums were one reason the government cracked down on total spending.
Austria's solution to the declining wage ratio and other issues related to rising contribution rates has been simpler and successful. Today, the share of tax financing is 30% of total health expenditure, much higher than in France, Germany, or the Netherlands. As in Switzerland, much of this revenue goes directly to care providers, reducing their need to charge patients. Inpatient care costs are shared between SHI and the government, and long-term care is largely funded by taxes. The contribution rate, as a consequence, is much lower than in Germany or France. Today, the insurance rate is 7.65% of gross wage income, with employees and employers each financing half of it and a maximum monthly premium of US$485 for high-income earners (Hauptverband 2018) . The second pathway to lower social insurance contributions in Austria is a relatively high private share of financing (voluntary private insurance and private out-of-pocket payment). With about one-quarter, Austria has a higher share of private funding than France, Germany, or the Netherlands, all below one-fifth. Redistribution comes through SHI premiums related to income and in particular through the tax system. Tax financing also ensures that capital-intensive companies contribute to health care funding.
Of these cases, health care funding in Germany seems most tied to the labor market and therefore more vulnerable to further decline of the wage ratio. The opt-out rule for higher-income groups in Germany makes SHI financing even more vulnerable and less redistributive. The other countries have relied more on other revenue sources, but there are significant differences between relying on general taxation and relying on flat-rate individual premiums.
A Trust Crisis in Social Health Insurance?
Taking into account increasing financial burdens and the large number of health reforms tried, a serious question is whether SHI in Europe faces a trust crisis. The answer is no. Satisfaction with systems is related to many factors, many also hard to measure, such as physician communication with patients, the relationship between cost-sharing amounts (not percentages) and personal income, the supply of services (for which spending is a factor), and expectations (Busse 2013; Popic and Schneider 2018; Wendt et al. 2012) . Nevertheless, it is worth noting that among European countries in the 2008-9 European Social Survey, the western nations with insurance systems tended to have higher public satisfaction than either national health service (NHS) systems or the eastern European insurance systems (which tend to have significantly lower expenditure on health care). Of the five highest-rated countries, four (Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands) were insurance countries (Popic and Schroeder 2018 ). An overview of various surveys with satisfaction data supports the view that respondents covered by SHI are fairly satisfied and that the positive perception has not been declining (Busse 2013: 258) .
A related question is whether support for redistribution is particularly threatened in SHI countries. Overall, those living in social insurance countries support a strong role of the state in health care. The view that health care should be the responsibility of the state or public health insurance is held by more than two-thirds of the population in Germany and France and by majorities in Austria and the Netherlands (Wendt 2013) . We might expect higher-income groups to support systems less than the lowerincome groups that need more assistance, yet there is no clear pattern. According to Eurobarometer data, higher-income groups are more satisfied than those with lower income in Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, but not in France. Higher-income groups favor a strong role of the state in health care somewhat less in Austria and France, but not in Germany and the Netherlands (Wendt 2013) .
A question highly relevant for the assessment of any health care system is this: "How confident are you that, if you become seriously ill, you will get quality and safe medical care?" High cost sharing tends to be one barrier, and we might expect it to be the major explanation of patients lacking confidence (Wendt et al. 2012 ). Yet a Commonwealth Fund survey in 2007 showed no clear pattern (Wendt et al. 2012) . 3 Various policies have increased cost sharing in some SHI countries, either by encouraging deductibles to reduce flat premiums (Netherlands and especially Switzerland) or by direct government policy (France and Germany, though from a much lower baseline in Germany). Higher cost sharing does not make patients feel better in most countries, and there is some evidence that it has led to greater concerns, especially in the Netherlands and Switzerland. Nevertheless, SHI systems in general appear to have no greater concerns about access, perhaps because, compared to NHS systems, they appear less likely to have capacity shortages. 4 In sum, western European SHI systems face no distinctive or apparent trust crisis.
3. The seven countries surveyed were Australia, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States. The Netherlands was a low-end outlier, with fewer than 5% of the population lacking confidence, and the United States was the high end; the other countries bunched together just above 20% (Wendt et al. 2012) .
4. There is no simple measure of these factors, but a comparison of the data used in Wendt et al. 2012 , Schoen et al. 2013 , and Osborn and Squires 2016 shows that waiting is more of a concern in NHS countries and cost sharing more in SHI countries. But the patterns are weak, because cost sharing varies substantially among SHI countries, and the data are not consistent; for example, the 2013 data show a large increase in cost concerns in the Netherlands compared to 2007, but that recedes in the 2016 data.
Conclusion
This review of SHI in Europe shows that SHI has moved toward universal health care and that the traditional values of solidarity and social security have even been strengthened over the past decades. Germany remains the only country in Europe where part of the population can opt out of SHI and purchase private insurance instead. Those not covered by SHI, however, are obliged to take up private health insurance. Like Austria, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, therefore, Germany has achieved universal coverage in health care.
In many European social insurance countries, "market" rhetoric has dominated the health reform debate since the early 1990s. A choice of funds and therefore competition among them are possible today in Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. At the same time, new state regulation has been introduced to achieve fair competition, such as risk adjustment schemes to reduce incentives for selecting "good risks," as in Germany and Switzerland. Concepts for improving individual choice have been developed in particular in Switzerland, where premiums can be shaped by choosing insurance plans, for instance, by choosing family doctors as gatekeepers (which, however, reduces possibilities of changing funds) or higher deductibles. Overall, choice among funds has been developed in a way that increased solidarity compared to the previous divisions by occupation (Germany, the Netherlands) or between private and social insurance fund coverage (the Netherlands).
There is little if any evidence that SHI causes higher cost increases than other types of systems. Nevertheless, the traditional wage base for SHI that makes financing pressures especially visible is problematic everywhere, so it has been supplemented through market-based premiums, other taxes (in particular France), and governments paying providers through general revenues separate from payments by insurers (the latter especially in Switzerland and Austria). Furthermore, not the individual fund but the government is now responsible for defining contribution rates (Austria, France, Germany) or flat-rate premiums (Switzerland).
This five-country comparison shows that the extent to which private insurers or insurers competing in markets violates the core principles of SHI depends dramatically on how it is regulated. In Germany, where for higher-income groups a change from social to private insurance is possible, a "basic tariff" unrelated to risk has been introduced that private insured patients can choose in case they are unable to pay rising premiums. In Switzerland and the Netherlands as well, where insurers are allowed to offer both social and commercial insurance, the insurance market is strictly regulated. Overall, social insurance and private health insurance have become more similar in western European health care systems.
SHI including the Swiss version with a less strict separation of social and commercial health insurance remains a popular way to pay for health care in Europe. Despite rising insurance premiums, a trust crisis related to SHI cannot be confirmed. Overall, European SHI still seems to fulfill its traditional promise of high social security and high-quality health care in the case of sickness that today is combined with universal coverage independent of individual risks. wendt@soziologie.uni-siegen.de
